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From Parameters, Spring 1997, pp. 134-51.
"Contemporary operational art . . . faces an array of new problems. In this area much still remains
unexplored and unresolved. Colossal changes in technology, armaments, and combat orders, which are
reflected in the evolution of tactics, are still far from being satisfactorily understood in the theoretical
sense on the scale of . . . the armed front as a whole." -- G. S. Isserson, 1932[1]

If the United States Army went to war tomorrow against a determined, technologically competent foe and based its
operations on the doctrine outlined in Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 1993,[2] the result would be at best a bloody
victory, at worst a bloodier defeat. Army doctrine has become confused. Although it is clear that information
technology has the potential to revolutionize many aspects of warfare, few are prepared to predict the outcomes of that
revolution. And although information-induced changes have already begun, even the US Army must still fight using
industrial age materiel and techniques.
AirLand Battle doctrine, epitomized by FM 100-5/1986, was and still is a very good doctrine for industrial age
warfare. Had subsequent editions of FM 100-5 retained it and improved on it, the US Army might now have a sound
basis for reviewing its core operational doctrine. Unfortunately, AirLand Battle became one of the casualties of the end
of the Cold War; FM 100-5/1993 eliminated it in favor of a generalized doctrine which is antithetical to the key
elements of AirLand Battle. The Army's most forward-looking doctrinal piece, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, has
subsequently consigned AirLand Battle to the dustbin of history along with other legacies of the industrial age.
The scope and meaning of the information revolution for the Army have not yet become clear. We are still in the
industrial age, as plans for Force XXI readily acknowledge. And even in the absence of a determined and
technologically sophisticated foe, the goals of our doctrine should be the same as they are now: to win quickly,
decisively, and at the least possible cost. If we are in fact facing a period of transition between 20th-century warfare
and some as-yet- undetermined future form of war, it behooves us to make AirLand Battle doctrine our basis for
understanding the future. That doctrine, suitably modified, can serve us until the full array of information technology-upon which rests current speculation of radical change in warfare--has been tested, acquired, and integrated into our
fleets of equipment. That doctrine, or one very similar to it, can then serve as the basis for our information age
doctrine. For the immediate future we need to help AirLand Battle doctrine become all it can possibly be.
Conceptual Dissonance
It has become fashionable to profess that the current fascination with information technology will result in a manner of
war so dominated by high-tech weaponry and so different from that to which we are accustomed that our current
modes of thinking about warfare will become irrelevant. Intelligent observers have pointed out that even in the current
epoch the ability to use strategic weapon systems to attain tactical goals, and tactical operations to attain strategic
goals, is blurring the levels of war as we are used to thinking about them.[3] At the same time, Force XXI documents
include wholly new categories and concepts of war--particularly information war and spectrum supremacy--implying
that future war will bear little or no relation to industrial age warfare.[4] Yet there is every reason to believe that
fundamental continuities in warfare will not be changing at the rate at which we expect our new technologies to change

the characteristics of conflict.
Previous radical changes in the ways and means of warfare, such as those induced by the gunpowder revolution and the
industrial revolution, did not render all previous understandings of war irrelevant. They revolutionized time-space
relationships on the battlefield, completely redefined tactical formations and drills, and increased firepower by orders
of magnitude, but important continuities remained. Commanders still needed to mass their forces--understanding
"mass" as the concentration of overwhelming force at the decisive point and time--to defeat their enemies, and they
still needed to win as quickly and decisively as possible at the least cost. To do this, they still needed to maneuver,
supply, command, staff, and provide intelligence to their forces. These aspects of warfare were not evolving at rates
comparable to the dominant change or to each other.
The technology which brought about the gunpowder revolution, for example, although it had important implications
for maneuver, supply, command, and staffing, did not in itself provide the solutions for the problems it created, and did
not affect intelligence gathering or dissemination at all. In the same way, it seems certain that an information
revolution in our own time will neither happen all at once, affecting every aspect of warfare simultaneously, nor affect
all aspects in comparable degrees, nor render irrelevant all doctrine and ways of thinking about war that preceded it. It
will be necessary, in other words, continually to change and perfect a doctrine, rather than seek to produce all at once
an "information age warfare" doctrine for which there is only an incomplete "information age" army.
A large part of the problem is that the US Army recognizes (judging from Force XXI) only two types of doctrine:
prescriptive and conceptual. AirLand Battle doctrine, seen as prescriptive, was designed to meet a particular threat in a
particular theater. Hence it could be declared outdated because the threat to which it owed its existence had passed.
Conventional wisdom--euphoric and largely misguided--similarly declared that because Europe would not likely be
the scene of future American conflicts, we could create a doctrine more suited to undefined opponents in undiscovered
regions. Force XXI and FM 100-5/1993, therefore, claim to be more conceptual than prescriptive and to rely on the
excellent leaders of America's forces to "fill in the gaps."[5]
This view of doctrine is too simple: doctrine can be conceptual without being devoid of content, and it can be
prescriptive without being either too specific or too binding. The real problem is that American doctrine has never
recognized that "prescriptions" can arise not from particular threats and regional scenarios, but simply from the
constant objectives of the state and the nature of war at a given time. This problem is especially serious for American
doctrine today with respect to the operational art, which has been the most important determinant of victory
throughout the industrial age, and bids fair to remain so for many years to come.
Current American doctrine does not distinguish between the operational level of war and the operational art, yet there
is an important difference. The operational level of war is simply, as American doctrine describes it, the level between
strategy and tactics which combines tactical successes into campaigns that achieve strategic victory. The operational art
is something else again. It is the determined search for ways to achieve dominating maneuver-- a manner of fighting
using high-speed maneuver and decisive firepower together to disorganize and confuse the enemy so that he can be
defeated psychologically even before his forces are destroyed physically.[6] Operational art, in other words, has a
content.
In a given period of warfare, under given conditions of war, operational art contains general suggestions for how to
achieve dominating maneuver. By defining operational art as merely the operational level of war, American doctrine
eliminates that content altogether and provides little guidance to the operational commander about how best to conduct
operations so as to win decisively, quickly, and at the lowest cost. American doctrine must take its starting point not
from potential technological capabilities, as Force XXI does, nor from a simple consideration of possible missions the
army might have to perform, as FM 100-5/1993 did, but instead from the serious consideration of this question: given
the current nature of warfare, how can American armies best achieve the objective of winning quickly and decisively
and at the lowest cost in lives and money?
AirLand Battle doctrine was the closest America has yet come to a coherent doctrine which answers that fundamental
question, even though the doctrine did not specifically ask it or set out to answer it. The reason for that success was, in
part, the fact that AirLand Battle doctrine had its roots in Soviet operational doctrine, a doctrine which did explicitly

pose and answer that question. As we shall see, however, FM 100-5/1993 has taken American doctrine down a wrong
path. The rest of this article examines AirLand Battle and its source, Soviet operational art, with a view to restoring
and improving the legitimacy of the concept of AirLand Battle. Doing so would produce a doctrine capable of taking
us well into the era of information warfare and, by constantly adjusting to changing circumstances, seeing us safely
through it.
The Development of Soviet Operational Art: Deep Battle
Soviet operational doctrine came into being in the 1920s as a tentative answer to the fundamental problem of war at
that time: how to return maneuver to a battlefield dominated by the firepower revolution. As tanks and aircraft
increased in performance and reliability, Soviet doctrine changed to meet the changes in warfare brought about by the
maneuver revolution resulting from the combination of new technologies and new doctrines in the 1920s and 1930s.
This process continued--although interrupted by the purge of the army in 1937 and the consequent triumph of
ideological stupidity through 1941--until the late 1950s when the advent of the nuclear age again posed a seemingly
insurmountable challenge to operational art. Of what import is operational art, Soviet theorists and political leaders
asked, when the next war will certainly be decided by nuclear missiles? By the late 1960s, those theorists (and a new
group of political leaders) had come to the conclusion that operational art epitomized by the rapid maneuver of largescale armored forces remained at the center of modern warfare, and found that the techniques developed to support
such art in the 1920s were readily adapted to the new conditions of the nuclear age.
Deep Battle is the only part of Soviet operational art which is reasonably well known in the West, and it is the element
of Soviet doctrine most accurately represented in AirLand Battle doctrine. Soviet Field Regulation 1936 (PU-36)
described Deep Battle as "attacking the enemy simultaneously over the entire depth of his field-force layout with a
view to isolating him, completely surrounding him, and destroying him."[7] But Deep Battle was only part of Soviet
operational art. To understand fully how the Soviets intended to achieve dominating maneuver, we must look more
closely at the context and content of Soviet operational art.
The Context of Deep Battle
Deep Battle doctrine was developed specifically to solve the fundamental problem in war at the time: how to restore
maneuver to a battlefield which had become static. Despite the Soviets' excellent understanding of the problem, they
could propose no solution to it in the 1920s aside from the wish that technology would solve the dilemma that
technology had created. What they could and did do, however, was identify the key traits which the new technology
would require in order to solve the principal problem in war.
The Soviets recognized that they were in a period of rapid technological change and that a revolution in military affairs
(RMA) was imminent,[8] but they did not simply wait to see what that RMA would bring. On the contrary, even in
1921, when the performance of tanks was still hopelessly inadequate to the task, they began to outline what tanks
would have to do in order to solve the operational problem. Soviet military leaders decided to guide the RMA by
driving technological change in a direction established by doctrine rather than allowing unfettered technological
change to determine it.[9]
Successive Operations--The Heart of Soviet Operational Art
Deep Battle was not alone the entire solution of the problem, for, in addition to trench warfare and the elastic defensein-depth, the Soviets believed that the consequences of the development of mass armies and of the complete
mobilization of societies for war also had to be dealt with. A war between mass armies, they believed, could not be
won in a single general engagement but only in an uninterrupted series of successive victories.[10] Napoleon's age had
passed: the search for a single decisive battle in the modern age would be fruitless.[11]
The Soviets came to believe, therefore, that victory in modern warfare could be attained only through a series of
operations executed consecutively and that "the uninterruptedness of the conduct of operations is the main condition of
victory." Operations could not and should not alternate with pauses, they argued, and commanders must act creatively
to maintain constant pressure on the enemy.[12]

M. N. Tukhachevskii, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces in the 1930s, wrote in 1924 that
operations must flow together as though they were simply "separate extensions of a single operation." If the enemy can
once be brought to battle, Tukhachevskii reasoned, and his defensive position broken, then the "new destructive
operation must follow straight from the advance, without any loss of time whatever." The key to victory in operations,
Tukhachevskii believed, was maintaining the initiative at all times:
One must remember that, even if he has only routed the enemy in the initial operation rather than
destroyed him, the attacker is in an extremely favourable position vis-à-vis the defeated side. He has
control of the situation, provided only that he denies the enemy freedom of action by continuous
pursuit.[13]
Tukhachevskii placed special emphasis on the absolute necessity for exploitation to follow immediately on penetration,
because a pause "deprives the victor of continued control of the situation . . . [and] faces him with the need to fight a
new battle, in which the chances of success are more or less equal for both sides, just as they are in the initial
operation."[14]
This belief in the danger of pauses was one of the fundamental principles of Soviet operational art. G. S. Isserson, the
Chief of the Department of Operational Art at the Frunze General Staff Academy in the 1930s, saw Deep Battle and
the uninterruptedness of operations as inseparable. He argued that in the conditions of contemporary warfare "future
deep operations will appear not as single links of a series of interrupted engagements, but as an unbroken chain
extending for the entire depth of military activities."[15]
This vision of deep battle is dramatically different from the vision of deep battle which served as the basis for AirLand
Battle. Whereas the depth in AirLand Battle was to be achieved by artillery, aviation, and missile fires,[16] Isserson
believed that battle depth would result from the rapid penetration of ground forces into the enemy's rear and their
uninterrupted pursuit of his fleeing forces. Isserson saw ground forces as the heart of all operations, close and deep,
and saw artillery and aviation elements only as support elements for those ground forces. He believed, moreover, that
the campaign would be decided by deep operations pursuing the vanquished foe.[17]
Nevertheless, the real solution to the problem, Isserson argued, lay not in technology or even in the development of
appropriate doctrine for using the technology, but in the proper understanding of the nature of war. In the period of
mass armies and defenses deployed in great depth, Isserson believed that army doctrine must be changed
fundamentally. An army simply could not deploy for maneuver in depth in the same fashion in which it would deploy
to fight linear war.
Isserson recognized that the reader would ask, "How can you keep the attack going that long? You will surely have to
stop when your attack culminates and regroup prior to retaking the offensive!" He responded, "The exhaustion of the
offensive has its true cause not so much in the self-exhaustion of the strength of the attacker as in the growth of the
opposition of the defender." For the defender, pushed back on his reserves and his logistical bases, may well end up
stronger at the culminating point of the attack then he had been at the beginning. Isserson believed that the greatest
danger for the attacker lay in thinking that "the final moment of the operation would be the easiest," and therefore
failing to prepare adequately for the final, climactic battle deep in the enemy's rear.
He argued that, on the contrary, the initial attack, "always secured by the timely concentration of forces and wellplanned preparation," will be by far the easiest, but that
the greatest tension and crisis must be expected at the end. The art and firmness of the operational
commander consists in approaching this decisive moment with full providence, with a new wave of
operational efforts and fully armed with the necessary forces and means for the final completion of the
destruction operation.
He concluded that "the contemporary operation is an operation of depth; it must be calculated for the entire depth and
must be prepared to conquer the entire depth."[18]
Such a general statement of the "solution," Isserson recognized, provided no solution at all. He saw, rather, that

doctrine had to include specific suggestions for the solution of known problems. Isserson was not willing to accept a
doctrine which foresaw that attacks would culminate prematurely, causing the army to go over to the defensive while
preparing new strikes. He believed instead that the deployment and maneuver of the attacking forces had to be
changed to avoid such premature culmination:
The deep echelonment of the opposition calls forth just as deep a deployment of the offensive. This
offensive must be like a whole series of waves flowing toward the shore with growing strength in order to
wash away and destroy it with their uninterrupted blows from the depths.[19]
Isserson thus introduced the notion that is at the heart of Soviet operational art: the echelonment of the attack to match
the echelonment of the defense, and the principle of strategic dispersion of forces prior to their massing for the final
decisive blow.
The outgrowth of the echelonment of the offensive was the "operational-maneuver group" (OMG).[20] The concept is
obvious in light of the experience of the First World War: the forces which make the breakthrough cannot then exploit
it in the face of strong resistance, for they will already have exhausted themselves, whereas arriving defending reserves
will be fresh. A special "exploitation echelon" must, therefore, be maintained which can penetrate the breach opened
by the assault forces and move for decisive victory into the operational depths. The Soviets conceived of the OMG as a
second-echelon force which, itself tactically echeloned,[21] would be capable of carrying on a series of uninterrupted
consecutive operations culminating in "the destruction of the opposition of the defense throughout the entire
operational depth." Isserson believed his principal enemy to be positional warfare, and sought to defeat it not simply
with Deep Battle or OMGs, but with the true implementation of the operational art: the pursuit of dominating
maneuver in the form of a planned series of consecutive operations conducted without pause from the moment when
breakthrough was achieved to the complete destruction of the enemy's defense throughout its entire depth.
AirLand Battle Doctrine
AirLand Battle doctrine is closely akin to the precepts of Soviet operational art outlined above. The kinship is
especially close in the areas of Deep Battle and armored doctrine. Despite the numerous passages in FM 100-5/1986
which resonate strongly with Soviet operational art, however, many other passages, and many more omissions, reveal
that the authors of FM 100-5/1986 rejected some of the central tenets of Soviet operational art. The AirLand Battle
doctrine outlined in FM 100-5/1986 is, therefore, contradictory and incoherent in important areas and does not provide
a clear guide for the conduct of war at the operational level.
To begin with, however, AirLand Battle doctrine was a giant step forward for the American army, and the "tenets" of
AirLand Battle were and are far superior to the "principles of war" which guided American doctrine before 1986, and
which seem to be returning to prominence today (at least to judge by FM 100-5/1993). AirLand Battle doctrine placed
maximum emphasis on the initiative:
[AirLand Battle doctrine] is based on securing or retaining the initiative and exercising it aggressively to
accomplish the mission. . . . [W]e must throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow from an
unexpected direction, follow up rapidly to prevent his recovery and continue operations aggressively to
achieve the higher commander's goals.[22]
The first tenet of AirLand Battle, initiative, reads almost as if it had been written by Isserson:
Applied to the force as a whole, initiative requires a constant effort to force the enemy to conform to our
operational purpose and tempo while retaining our own freedom of action. . . .
In the attack, initiative implies never allowing the enemy to recover from the initial shock of the attack.
This requires surprise in selecting the time and place of attack; concentration, speed, audacity, and
violence in execution; the seeking of soft spots; flexible shifting of the main effort; and prompt transition
to exploitation. The goal is the creation of a fluid situation in which the enemy steadily loses track of
events and thus coherence. The defender is not given the time to identify and mass his forces or supporting
fires against the attack because of the ambiguity of the situation presented to him and the rapidity with

which it changes. Retaining the initiative over time requires thinking ahead, planning beyond the initial
operation, and anticipating key events on the battlefield hours, days, and weeks ahead.[23]
AirLand Battle doctrine implicitly recognized the problem which the Soviets had developed their operational art to
solve--if the defender is given the opportunity to gather his wits about him and reorganize, he can at the least re-form
a coherent defense and force the attacker to fight, in effect, another penetration battle, the costs of which will be high
and the result of which will be in doubt. The solution is to develop a force structure and a doctrine which, having once
penetrated, will be able to retain the initiative, keep the enemy disorganized, and push forward at high speed until total
victory has been attained.
The second tenet of AirLand Battle, agility, also underlined the importance of speed and the need to retain the
initiative:
Agility--the ability of friendly forces to act faster than the enemy--is the first prerequisite for seizing and
holding the initiative. Such greater quickness permits the rapid concentration of friendly strength against
enemy vulnerabilities. This must be done repeatedly so that by the time the enemy reacts to one action,
another has already taken its place, disrupting his plans and leading to late, uncoordinated, and piecemeal
enemy responses.[24]
In other words, the attacker must force changes in the situation faster than the defender can evaluate and respond to
them. In this way the attacker can keep the defender from ever re-forming a coherent defense and initiating countermeasures of his own. Similarly, in its discussion of close, deep, and rear operations and the use of armored forces,
AirLand Battle doctrine appears to be a statement of determination to execute dominating maneuver--the goal of good
operational art.
But there were important problems with American operational doctrine even in 1986. In the first place, AirLand Battle
doctrine took no real account of the issue of consecutive operations. The Soviets in the 1920s had identified not one,
but two fundamental problems in that epoch of warfare: trenches and positional warfare resulting from the firepower
revolution formed one problem, but the enormous growth both of populations and of industrial power, and the
development of the means of harnessing those factors to create mass armies, formed a separate problem. Of those two
problems, the mass army and the mobilized state has proved the more enduring, yet AirLand Battle doctrine did not
recognize that this problem might prevent the Army from attaining decisive objectives in a single operation. It
mentioned only:
Sequential campaigns in a single theater occur when a large force changes or secures its original goal or
when the conditions of the conflict change. . . . Or a new offensive campaign may have to be undertaken if
strategic goals change or are not secured in the initial campaign.[25]
Far from recognizing and confronting the likely need for consecutive operations, therefore, AirLand Battle doctrine
implicitly assumed that consecutive operations, in the ordinary course of events, would not be necessary. In other
words, AirLand Battle doctrine rejected the advance made by Soviet operational art and returned to the age of
Napoleon in its thinking:
[Operational art's] essence is the identification of the enemy's operational center-of-gravity--his source of
strength or balance--and the concentration of superior combat power against that point to achieve a
decisive success.[26]
The general assertion that the attacker should seek out the defender's center of gravity and attempt to destroy it is, of
course, correct. The problem with this statement, as with many other statements in FM 100-5/1986, is, rather, in its
tone and in its omissions. In general, AirLand Battle doctrine leaves the reader with the feeling that if it is not possible
to win the war in a single campaign, or the campaign in a single operation, then American forces will pause, regroup,
plan, and deliberately launch another campaign or operation. The doctrine implies that it is not necessarily the case that
successive operations will be needed. By failing entirely to address the issue of operational pauses, furthermore, FM
100-5/1986 conveys the impression that the length of the pause is not important. These problems are especially clear in
its fixation on culminating points and phases of the offensive.

Reaching back to Clausewitz for another concept, AirLand Battle doctrine asserts that "a vital consideration for
operational commanders during a campaign is sensing culminating points." It continues:
In the attack, operational commanders design their campaigns to defeat the enemy prior to reaching their
culminating point. Defending commanders try to avoid a decision until the attacker has to assume the
defense himself. The attacker must sense his own culminating point and avoid overextension. Since all
offensive operations end in defensive dispositions, this phase of the campaign should be foreseen and
planned.[27]
It hardly requires saying that commanders design campaigns to win before they culminate, or that the defenders try to
stay alive until the attack has culminated, thereby allowing the defenders to seize the initiative and counter-attack. It is
also obvious that the attacker must be wary of his attack's culminating too soon, as well as of overextending himself.
From all of which it does not follow that all offensive operations end in defensive dispositions and that a defensive
phase of an offensive campaign should be foreseen and planned for. On the contrary, the conclusion should be that the
attacker should in every way possible see to it that his attack does not culminate too soon. If the attacker feels that his
attack will soon culminate, he should examine every expedient which could keep the attack going long enough to
attain his objective. Above all, the planners of the campaign should have seen to it in the first place that the attack
would succeed before it culminated and should have made provision against the need to reinforce the attack to keep it
from culminating prematurely. To foresee and plan for a phase of defensive operations before the attack has achieved
its objectives, a proposition stated clearly here, is to foresee and plan for likely defeat.
The theme of culminating points and transition to the defense recurs later on in FM 100-5/1986:
Operational level offensive planning must take into account the influence of friction and make a realistic
estimate of friendly capabilities. When complete success cannot be attained in a single operation, the
campaign should be separated into phases that allow the attacker to regain the advantage before
continuing. When forces are inadequate for the complete occupation of the theater, the commander may
have to assume the defensive when he has reached his culminating point.[28]
Again, the failure in the doctrine is in omission, not in statement. It is true that when forces inadequate to attain the
objective are launched on an offensive they will probably reach a culminating point and have to go over to the
defensive while reinforcements are brought up and successive operations are planned. The bland statement of this
proposition, however, implies that it is a normal occurrence which presents no particular problems when, in fact, it is a
dreadful occurrence which may cost success in the operation, the campaign, or even the war. This statement implicitly
assumes that force composition, force structure, and doctrine are constant and that they may or may not be sufficient to
attain the objective. If they are not, then the attack will have to stop for a time. What will happen when the attack stops
is not described, but is clear from history: the defender will regroup and reorganize his forces into a coherent defensive
position. He will bring up reinforcements and develop fieldworks and obstacles. If the pause is long enough, he may
correct deficiencies in his own planning and doctrine which the just-concluded successful operation has shown him. In
the worst case, he may launch his own offensives either as spoiling attacks or as counteroffensives. The initiative, in
other words, will have passed to the defender, and the attacker again will have to expend lives, time, and treasure to
regain it and proceed with his own attack. This is not a matter to be tossed off lightly or (as here) totally ignored. On
the contrary, it is the heart of the problem of operational art.
The Wrong Direction: FM 100-5 in 1993
Whatever may have been the flaws of the AirLand Battle concept outlined in FM 100-5/1986, that doctrine was
nevertheless both a vast improvement over previous American doctrine and a giant step in the right direction. Since
the experience of the Gulf War did not invalidate the basic principles of AirLand Battle--or of operational art as the
Soviets conceived it, for that matter--it would have seemed obvious that the next iteration of FM 100-5 would see even
further improvement in AirLand Battle doctrine and additional steps in the right direction. Unfortunately, FM 1005/1993 completely eliminated the more or less coherent doctrine embodied by AirLand Battle and replaced it with a
confused mass of contradictory operational prescriptions which add up to a determination to move slowly and
cautiously, avoid casualties at all costs, and achieve victory through planning. So thoroughly was AirLand Battle

rejected as a concept that the term does not appear in FM 100-5/1993, a sign as ominous in its own way as was the
disappearance of the term "deep battle" from Soviet doctrine in the years following Tukhachevskii's murder.
The largest single change in the tone of FM 100-5 in 1993 was the incredible emphasis on planning as the route to all
military benefits, to the exclusion of even the most basic advice about how to achieve good combined arms operations,
synchronization, initiative, and surprise operationally:
The application of combined arms . . . is complex and demanding. It requires detailed planning and
violent execution by highly trained soldiers and units who have been thoroughly rehearsed.[29]
Retaining the initiative over time requires thinking ahead, planning beyond the initial operations, and
anticipating key events on the battlefield hours, days, and weeks in advance.[30]
In a violently executed attack, agility is particularly important. It requires that commanders anticipate
developments and prepare branches and sequels so that they are ready to exploit opportunities by shifting
forces and activities quickly.[31]
To preserve synchronization on a fluid battlefield, commanders conduct detailed initial planning.[32]
In each of these examples, the problem lies not in what was said, but in what was not said. By pointing out the need
for careful planning and implying that initiative, synchronization, and agility, among other traits, can be attained
through planning, the doctrine obscures the fact that action, not preparation, wins or loses battles. The most detailed
description of desirable procedures in FM 100-5/1993 focuses exclusively on the planning process:
As part of the preparation process (during the deliberate planning process for lower echelons before they
issue their orders), commanders gather their subordinate commanders and battle staffs to review and adjust
the synchronization of the battle plan. This brief-back is normally conducted over a map or terrain model.
It begins with the subordinate commanders' descriptions of the timing and employment of their concepts of
maneuver and fires to execute their commander's course of action and likely contingencies. Face-to-face
synchronization meetings serve to reveal operational gaps and synchronization problems. Commanders
and staffs do a lot of if this, then this type of wargaming. They might even ask an element to role-play the
enemy to effect a two-sided nature to planning--just as will occur in the attack. Commanders also provide
for branches and sequels to the basic plan so that, during conduct of the operation, units can more easily
adapt while sustaining the momentum.[33]
The planning process outlined in this selection is a good one-the problem is that it is far more detailed than any of the
sections relating to actually conducting operations. Whereas the doctrine outlines planning procedures down to such
details as the advisability of conducting planning brief-backs over maps or terrain models, such critical operational
issues as conducting and exploiting penetrations, defending against enemy attacks, and the use of reserves receive little
or no attention.
The emphasis on planning is unfortunate, but does not in itself constitute a fundamental flaw in the doctrine, or a
fundamental turn away from the trail blazed by FM 100-5/1986. The treatment of speed and initiative in FM 1005/1993, however, does constitute such a turn. FM 100-5/1993 basically rejects the desirability of maintaining highspeed, high-tempo operations, and fundamentally misunderstands the nature of initiative and the ways in which an
army can attain and maintain it.
FM 100-5/1993 redefined initiative from "setting or changing the terms of battle by action" to "depleting the enemy's
options while still having options of their own." It abjured the notion of risk-taking as well; whereas AirLand Battle
sought to achieve the initiative through "audacity which may involve risk-taking," FM 100-5/1993 makes no mention
of "risk-taking" and seeks to attain the initiative by "anticipating events on the battlefield"--in other words, by planning
carefully.[34]
This focus on planning to achieve initiative is not confined to the definition. On the contrary, the doctrine frequently
repeats the assertion that initiative means having options when the enemy has none and that this situation can be

achieved by planning and forethought:
Commanders achieve the initiative by making adjustments and having options when the enemy has
none.[35]
Staffs continually work to generate workable options for the commander as fighting continues and friendly
forces seek to gain and maintain the initiative.[36]
The initiative is critical to successful offensive operations. Whatever its purpose, campaign plans must be
flexible enough to accommodate change so commanders can shift their main effort in response to either
setback or opportunity without losing the initiative. Accordingly, commanders anticipate likely enemy
actions and prepare contingencies for them and train their units to do likewise. Successful commanders do
not run out of options, and are always looking for ways to hurt the enemy. Anticipation and continuous
formulation of attack options are key.[37]
Commanders and staffs gain and maintain the initiative by continuously developing executable options
through the campaign to keep the enemy off balance.[38]
This definition of initiative is fundamentally at variance with the AirLand Battle definition--and with any definition
which has been used by successful armies before. Good planning is necessary if a force is to gain the initiative, as it is
in any military operation, but it is not sufficient for conducting successful campaigns. The keys to attaining the
initiative are speed and surprise, and the key to retaining the initiative is the uninterrupted conduct of operations. All
three of those elements require good anticipation and planning, it is true, but FM 100-5/1993 clearly implies that
anticipation and planning alone will achieve and maintain the initiative, which they most emphatically will not. It is
astounding that a doctrine supposedly drawing conclusions from the Gulf War would conclude that speed and the
uninterrupted conduct of operations were less important than they had been, yet that is precisely what FM 100-5/1993
did.
In 1986, AirLand Battle had listed speed as one of the characteristics of offensive operations and stated:
The attack must move rapidly. Speed is absolutely essential to success; it promotes surprise, keeps the
enemy off balance, contributes to the security of the attacking force, and prevents the defender from taking
effective countermeasures. Properly exploited, speed can confuse and immobilize the defender until the
attack becomes unstoppable. Finally, speed can compensate for a lack of mass and provide the momentum
necessary for attacks to achieve their aims.[39]
In 1993, the entire section on speed was eliminated and its place taken by a section on tempo, which rejected the
importance of speed in the conduct of offensive operations:
Tempo is the rate of speed of military action; controlling or altering that rate is essential for maintaining
the initiative. As opposing forces battle one another, military operations alternate between actions and
pauses. Sometimes units go slow at one point in order to go fast later. Commanders seek a tempo that
maintains relentless pressure on the enemy to prevent him from recovering from the shock and effects of
the attack. . . .
Tempo can be either fast or slow. While speed is often preferred, commanders adjust tempo to ensure
synchronization. At times, tempo may be slowed to ensure conditions are set before accelerating again to
gain the advantages that come with speed. The attacker may adjust his tempo prior to the final decisive
action to ensure the location of key enemy targets, to arrange forces for a simultaneous attack in depth, or
to complete resupply and repositioning to sustain the immediate transition to exploitation and pursuit. . . .
Tempo provides the necessary momentum for attacks to achieve their objectives. Tempo is a combination
of speed and mass that creates pressure on the enemy. Speed, moreover, is not a substitute for the mass
produced by sound tactics. Commanders who overextend their ability to mass effects or otherwise act
hastily may give the advantage to the enemy.[40]

Thus FM 100-5/1993 rejects the importance of speed and concludes that mass, not speed, is the key to successful
attack. Since it is clear from the rest of the doctrine that by mass is meant not massing of forces, but massing of fires,
it is clear that FM 100-5/1993 is an applied firepower doctrine: tactics which in any way hinder the massing of all
available fires, even for the purpose of maintaining speed and the initiative, are "unsound." Speed has been replaced as
a desirable characteristic by "tempo" which is defined as speed plus mass--and speed was definitely not considered
sufficient to make up for deficiencies in mass.
The emphasis on mass and planning, and the deemphasis of speed, reflect a more fundamental problem: FM 1005/1993 is a doctrine which is afraid of the capabilities of its own forces and is dominated by the fear of taking
casualties. In discussing battle command, the emphasis is decidedly not on audacity and decisiveness:
Decision making is knowing if to decide, then when and what to decide. These are tactical, operational,
and strategic judgments. Being in command means anticipating the activities that will be put into motion
once a decision is made, knowing how irretrievable some commitments will be once put into motion;
knowing the consequences of the act of deciding; anticipating the outcomes that can be expected from the
implementation of a decision.[41]
In discussing penetration operations, the emphasis is on how costly they are:
Because penetration is an attack into the strength of the defense, it could be costly in friendly casualties.
Penetration may be necessary to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to create assailable flanks and
access to the enemy's rear. Commanders may attempt penetration on one or several axes, depending on the
forces available. Commanders carefully weigh the advantage of attacks on multiple axes to avoid undue
costs and casualties.[42]
It is quite true that penetration operations may be higher in cost than exploitations, and that they should be avoided
whenever possible--but the fear of losing control of a fast battlefield has led to a determination to move slowly and
cautiously which will ensure that the army will have to fight frequent penetration battles. The whole idea behind the
Soviet emphasis on speed, and AirLand Battle's emphasis on speed and initiative, was that the army would have to
fight a single penetration battle, while the maintenance of the initiative through the conduct of high speed operations
would ensure that all future operations would be in the nature of exploitations. The point was to prevent the enemy
from ever re-forming a coherent defense which would have to be penetrated. FM 100-5/ 1993 still desires to keep the
defense disorganized, but has become so concerned with culminating and with loss of "synchronization" through
"excessive" speed, that it practically guarantees the defense time to reorganize itself.
The fear of losing control has gone so far that FM 100-5/1993 defines a new type of culmination--intelligence
culmination:
Factors other than combat losses and lack of resources can influence culmination. For example, a
commander could outrun his current intelligence in an attack that moves faster and farther than planned.
The resulting increase in risk by continuing to advance may be acceptable if the commander knows he can
overmatch any combination of forces he is likely to encounter. Given the lack of sufficient intelligence at
that time, however, he may begin taking needless losses or otherwise jeopardize the success of his
operations. At that point, the better course of action might be to go more slowly to develop the
situation.[43]
Casualties should be kept to a minimum. There can be no doubt of the desirability of conducting operations with as
little loss of life as possible. The question is how to minimize losses, however, not whether or not to minimize losses.
The confusion in current doctrine is fundamental, in that it reflects the fact that many people identify speed with loss of
control and unconcern about losses. Slowness, on the other hand, correlates highly with prudence and the desire to
minimize losses. Despite common misperceptions, however, even Soviet doctrine was designed to minimize losses,
and the lessons of the historical study of operational art make it clear that appropriate speed keeps losses to a
minimum, and prudent slowness, to the contrary, is highly dangerous.

Part of the problem lies in the fact that FM 100-5/1993 greatly underestimates the capability of modern Army forces to
move fast without losing control and incurring "needless" losses, and also greatly underestimates the enemy's likely
ability to respond. Despite numerous exhortations to remember that battle is not one-sided, FM 100-5/1993 never
considers that operational pauses and reductions in tempo give the enemy the opportunity to respond and reform his
defenses. Perhaps because the Iraqis proved so maladroit in this area, the current doctrine takes it for granted that we
can move slowly and deliberately with impunity. There is no basis in fact for this belief. In the face of a motivated,
determined, well-equipped enemy, slowness kills more surely than speed. FM 100-5/1993 presents no argument to
undermine the view of operational art outlined by the Soviets in the 1920s and 1930s, which argued that high-speed
ground operations, conducted in harmony with air (and now missile) attacks throughout the depth of the enemy
defense, would make it possible to launch a single penetration operation and then achieve victory on however large a
scale through the rapid and uninterrupted exploitation of the initial breakthrough. That principle, the principle of
dominating maneuver, remains valid to this day and is not in any way challenged by FM 100-5/1993. It is the principle
of operational art to which American doctrine urgently needs to return.
Toward a New FM 100-5
All of the flaws in FM 100-5 outlined above are flaws of execution which come from a major flaw of conception.
Field Manual 100-5, Operations, claims to be the Army's "keystone warfighting doctrine. It is a guide for Army
commanders. It describes how to think about the conduct of campaigns."[44] The trouble is that FM 100-5 does not
seek to answer the right question. It is organized in a way which answers the question, "What sorts of operations
might the Army have to conduct and how, generally, should it think about conducting those operations?" The result is
a very shallow doctrine. An Army commander who looked to FM 100-5 to find out how to conduct offensive
operations, what the role of the exploitation in operations should be, or how to deploy forces and conduct operations
so as to achieve the most decisive possible victory in the shortest possible time with the fewest possible casualties,
would come up almost empty. FM 100-5 describes what the desired outcomes and methods of proceeding are, but
leaves vague or undefined how they should be achieved. It is a doctrine without a content.
Part of this lack of content is surely deliberate, and reflects the desire to avoid restricting the actions of commanders in
the field. This desire is reasonable--it is not possible for the writer of doctrine to prescribe in advance the details of
deployment or of the operational use of forces in any given circumstance. On the other hand, a balance must be struck
between trammeling the commander's options and giving him no guidance whatsoever. The Army's "keystone
warfighting doctrine" must do more to suggest how the commander on the ground can go about accomplishing what he
must.
One way to do that is to reorganize FM 100-5 so that it answers the questions, "What are the most significant problems
in warfare in this epoch which a successful army must solve, and how can we go about solving them?" Such an
approach would give to FM 100-5 a coherence, cogency, and content that would make it much more useful to
operational commanders than it currently is. Soviet Deep Battle doctrine was specifically designed to answer that
question for the main problem of the 1920s: how to return maneuver to war. It began explicitly with that question, and
just as explicitly answered it: deep battle, armored forces of certain capabilities, and the conduct of operations in a
particular general way would avoid trench warfare and restore mobility. From that doctrine it was possible to determine
what technical characteristics weapon systems had to have, and then to press the development of those systems along
the right lines.
The Soviets could also easily determine what their tactical and operational doctrine had to be in order to answer the
needs of warfare at the time. The doctrine that they produced was coherent and had great content, although it did, in
fact, go too far, restricting the options of commanders by paying excessive attention to tactical and operational details.
American doctrine today can proceed along a similar course without, however, restricting commanders' options. It
must chart a middle course between Soviet doctrine of the past and FM 100-5 as it is now, answering the questions:
"What are the most significant problems in warfare today, and how will we solve them to attain victory?"
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